Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Ever since its inception the most important question about the BRICS grouping was whether it would be capable of transforming itself into an effective platform for economic cooperation. And the greatest riddle of all with regard to this fundamental question was the lack of coordinated initiatives in the trade sphere. But with the unprecedented pressure leveled on BRICS by the threat of US tariffs and the plans to discuss a BRICS coordinated response to these challenges, long-awaited changes in BRICS approach to trade policy coordination may finally transpire. In particular, Brazil’s President Lula as the leader of the economy that holds BRICS chairmanship, has initiated discussions on how a BRICS coordinated response could be mustered in the face of mounting protectionism. We proceed with a look at the possible modalities of how such a policy shift could be undertaken by BRICS in the near term.

Thus far mutual trade liberalization has not been facilitated by the BRICS platform, but was rather relegated to bilateral trade negotiations. While there was important progress in raising the intensity of mutual trade among the largest BRICS economies (most notably across such pairs as Russia-China), there were no attempts to multilateralize such trade liberalization impulses across the rest of the BRICS platform, let alone the BRICS+ format. As a result, as of yet, BRICS have no clear-cut road-map for trade liberalization, no mechanism for spreading market openness across the wider BRICS+ framework, and no joint bloc within the WTO’s groups in negotiations.

Admittedly, in recent periods some tacit steps have been undertaken by BRICS in the sphere of trade coordination. In particular, in July 2024 we reported that “during the meeting of BRICS Economy and Foreign Trade Ministers in Moscow, representatives of BRICS economies agreed to coordinate their policies within the WTO. The key priorities of the creation of such a BRICS platform within the WTO include supporting the organization’s viability and effectiveness in resolving trade disputes (given the challenges faced in the operation of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body) as well as in countering rising protectionism” [1]. So far, however, progress has been slow, with BRICS representatives yet to reach consensus on the key trade policy issues[2].

For BRICS a coordinated stance/consolidated representation in trade talks as a bloc delivers a much stronger bargaining position compared to bilateral discussions of BRICS economies such as India or South Africa with the US, the EU or other global economy heavyweights. The big question is whether the BRICS can agree on trade policy coordination in trade talks as a bloc – something that may be challenging due to the lack of prior coordination and the divergence in the trade regimes across the largest emerging markets. In the past several years, the mounting protectionism in the global economy as well as the widening of the ranks of BRICS core membership have not made the attainment of such consensus easier.

In terms of possible trade strategies that could be jointly pursued by BRICS vis-à-vis the rest of the world there is the well-known “competitive liberalization”[3] approach pursued by the US several decades ago. This strategy would focus on stoking competition for market access to BRICS markets through granting greater openness to those economies that provide the most favorable market access conditions in return. The greater the platform’s market, the more economic growth it can offer and the greater the potential reduction in import barriers (all these conditions being very much present with respect to BRICS) – the more the incentive for economies to compete in granting favorable conditions to such a platform.

Another possible approach could be a joint BRICS motion within the WTO to launch a new round of trade liberalization – contrary to prior efforts that failed to materialize in the past several decades, such a WTO trade round could allow for plurilateral agreements, i.e. those that do not require the participation of all WTO members. A new trade round driven by the BRICS economies could accord due priority to the needs of least-developed economies, including those from Africa. Within this track the BRICS could also attempt to address the issues of WTO reform as well as the re-launching of the dispute settlement mechanisms in the global economy.

Yet another approach for BRICS is to build on the existing network of trade alliances of BRICS economies by multilateralizing them across the BRICS or the BRICS+ platform. This multilateralization could be built on a coordinated framework of regional integration arrangements (that are increasingly driving the trade policies of BRICS economies) in which BRICS economies are members – something that we earlier referred to as the BEAMS platform[4]. The BEAMS framework aims to promote trade agreements across the main regional integration arrangements of the Global South, thus serving to boost South-South trade. In fact, the very concept of BRICS+ advanced in the beginning of 2017 was predicated on a roadmap of trade alliances and market openness across BRICS core members and their regional partners[5].

The above three options could be pursued separately or in combination of several tracks. The key point about such a BRICS response to higher US tariffs is that instead of prioritizing reciprocal protectionism, it focusses on opening the gateways to greater South-South economic cooperation. But while the focus of BRICS coordinated response should certainly be greater South-South trade, at this crucial juncture for the world economy the ambition of the bloc should perhaps be elevated to targeting a relaunching of the globalization effort, but on a more sustainable basis and with greater regard for needs of the developing world compared to earlier globalization attempts[6].

In the end, the BRICS may be about to make the first tangible steps towards forming a vision of trade policy coordination and mutual trade liberalization. In such a scenario, the relevance of the bloc’s initiatives for the world economy and the financial markets could increase. Most importantly, however, such steps would start to deliver tangible benefits to households and enterprises across the Global South, while also making a palpable contribution to fostering closer South-South economic cooperation. The ability of BRICS to achieve consensus on trade issues remains an open question, however, particularly given the greater diversity of the bloc after its expansion in membership in the past several years.

South Africa
Source: iol.co.za

The G20 (Group of 20) was established in 1999 in the wake of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis as an informal platform bringing together Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from the world’s leading developed and emerging economies to address global economic and financial stability. While its early discussions centred primarily on broad macroeconomic concerns, the G20 has since broadened its scope to cover a wider range of global priorities, including trade, climate action, sustainable development, health, agriculture, energy, environmental protection, and anti-corruption efforts.

BRICS was established in a similar fashion, as quoted by Cole Jackson: “The BRICS grouping has, to a large extent, grown naturally considering the global climate during its formation and in today’s context. BRICS was formed in 2009. Its formation follows the 2007/08 financial crisis, caused by a period of dramatic economic downturn in the United States (US)--due to the housing market collapse and a subprime mortgage crisis–leading to a global recession. Many countries, the world over, bore the brunt of this recession, especially those countries in the Global South already battling economic difficulties.”

The G20 comprises BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia) and other countries in the Global South (Argentina & Mexico). These presidencies and officials often overlap between countries in the Global South, G20, BRICS (and its associated institutions like the New Development Bank (NDB)). This in essence, means more than a quarter of members are BRICS or Global South affiliated. However, due to the United States (US) & Canada, for example, being part of the G7 they need to collaborate and deliberate with many of these countries having BRICS/Global South agendas to fulfill.

The intersection:

• Reforming Global Governance

G20: Includes both developed and emerging economies and increasingly acknowledges the need for reform in global financial institutions (like the IMF and World Bank).
BRICS: Actively pushes for a multipolar world and reform of institutions to reflect the voices of emerging powers and developing nations.
Global South: Wants a fairer system where their voices are heard and interests are not sidelined by traditional Western powers.

• Promoting Inclusive and Sustainable Development

G20: Advocates for sustainable development, climate finance, and reducing inequality, especially through multilateral cooperation.
BRICS: Prioritises development-led growth, infrastructure financing (e.g., through the New Development Bank), and South-South cooperation.
Global South: Seeks development financing and capacity building on their terms, focusing on health, education, and infrastructure.

• South-South Cooperation

G20: While not centered on the Global South, it increasingly includes dialogues on cooperation between developing countries.
BRICS: Champions South-South cooperation as a means to share resources, technology, and strategies among developing nations.
Global South: Sees South-South partnerships as more equitable alternatives to Western aid or conditional loans.

• Multipolarity and Economic Sovereignty

G20: Includes rising powers like India, China, Brazil, and South Africa, reflecting a shift away from unipolar dominance.
BRICS: Promotes a multipolar world order with diversified centers of power.
Global South: Seeks to reduce dependency on the West and build regional blocs and alternative financial institutions.

• Climate Justice and Energy Transitions

G20: Has focused on climate change mitigation and adaptation, though progress varies.
BRICS: Supports climate action but emphasizes common but differentiated responsibilities.
Global South: Advocates for climate finance, technology transfer, and the right to develop.
The growing alignment between the G20, BRICS, and the Global South reflects a strategic shift towards a more inclusive and multipolar global order. With overlapping memberships and shared priorities—ranging from global governance reform and sustainable development to climate justice and economic sovereignty—these groupings increasingly influence one another. BRICS and the Global South have injected fresh urgency and purpose into G20 deliberations, pushing for a system that better represents emerging economies and developing nations. As this alignment deepens, it strengthens efforts to reshape international institutions, promote equitable growth, and ensure that the voices of the Global South are not only heard but also acted upon.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

The summer of 2025 has been a busy one for international development assistance.

Seville hosted the 4^th International Conference on Financing for Development; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) released a report projecting cuts in aid from major donors; and the Aid Transparency Index, long used for assessing the effectiveness of donor spending, announced that future rankings will only be granted to those who pay for participation. In this climate, what is the state of play for the so-called “new donors,” which include BRICS countries outside the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and is their role expected to grow?

The Rio Declaration, adopted in July 2025, gives no reason to hope for close cooperation within BRICS in international development assistance anytime soon. True to form, it underscores the importance of multilateral financing mechanisms for various areas of sustainable development, including humanitarian aid, healthcare, climate change and food security, but says nothing about potential cooperation among BRICS members or bilateral (donor–recipient) aid, even in a South–South partnership format. This omission, in part, comes from the differences in approaches and priorities in international development assistance: Egypt and Ethiopia remain exclusively aid recipients; China, India, Indonesia and South Africa are part of the South–South cooperation framework; while Russia and the Arab states are often grouped separately.

There is no consensus on the place of “new donors,” and BRICS in particular, in the international aid architecture. On the one hand, their aid volumes are still small in contrast with those of major traditional donors, so it is premature to speak of any significant shifts in the global system of development assistance. This is particularly evident when compared to the top five donors, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and France (Fig. 1). In 2023, traditional donors that are members of the OECD DAC provided almost $250 billion in total aid, while BRICS nations contributed $14 billion. So it cannot be said that BRICS countries have a meaningful impact on the existing system of development assistance, given the relatively small amount of aid they provide. It should be noted, however, that for most BRICS members—with the exception of the Arab states that follow OECD reporting standards and Russia, which did so until 2022—the figures are only estimates. For example, the AidData database puts China’s international development assistance in 2023 at 43 billion yuan, while the Chinese Foreign Ministry estimates it at 20 billion yuan, around half as much.

Figure 1. Aid provided by BRICS countries and the five largest donors in 2023

[USD billion; U.S. Germany Japan France UK Saudi Arabia, China, Brazil* Russia UAE India South Africa Indonesia]
*Data for Brazil refer to 2021
Sources: OECD Data Explorer, Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund

On the other hand, mounting dissatisfaction with the traditional aid system and the increasing weight of BRICS countries in the global economy give reason to believe that over the next 10–15 years they could emerge as important actors in development assistance as well. A big factor here is the development path of the group’s members, which demonstrates how economic growth can be achieved today (bearing in mind that nearly all major developed countries pulled ahead economically during industrialization in the 19^th century), and their capacity to offer consultative support. Individually, the biggest BRICS donors, except Russia, are indeed actively promoting the concept of partnership-based aid, referring to it as South–South cooperation, without, however, bringing the issue into BRICS resolutions. For Russia, the problem lies in the wording: the principles of aid-partnership match the format, but the term “South” rules it out geographically.

The South–South partnership concept has been a fixture in the development agenda since the Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 and is recognized in the 2025 Seville Commitment alongside conventional official development assistance (ODA). Its core principles, outlined in the declaration following the 2009 Nairobi meeting, include mutual benefit, non-conditionality of financing, and non-interference in domestic affairs of recipient states, among other things. Among BRICS members, China and India are the most active in advancing this concept. Much of China’s and India’s aid is aimed at boosting exports by developing transport infrastructure linking them with neighboring countries. For example, Bhutan, the largest recipient of India’s concessional funding, has seen extensive road development projects in its border regions. Brazil, which mainly provides technical assistance for food security, is also seen as part of the South–South strategy. Since 2013, China’s approach to international development assistance has been largely anchored in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both in terms of how funding is positioned and allocated across sectors—with infrastructure as a priority—and in terms of recipient countries’ participation in the project. For example, the share of transport in China’s development aid rose from 19% in 2000–2013 to 30% in 2014–2023.

Russia and South Africa pursue aid strategies that are more consistent with those of traditional donors. Although South Africa, as an active player in many platforms for developing countries, identifies with the South–South partnership model, its aid portfolio is dominated by humanitarian assistance, often in parallel with peacekeeping operations in the region—which has little to do with the idea of mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Russia’s aid structure, when it was still reported according to OECD standards, was also similar to traditional patterns, with a large share devoted to humanitarian assistance, the social sector and debt write-offs, and less emphasis on industrial and infrastructure development. However, the picture is more nuanced here as well. For example, Russia has a strong global standing in energy infrastructure (Rosatom builds some nuclear power plants overseas on concessional terms), which can qualify as a form of international development assistance in the broader sense of the term.

Arab donors are typically placed in a distinct category. Like South Africa, they identify with the South–South partnership, yet they stand out as the only major developing-country donors that follow OECD DAC reporting standards. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are frequently recognized by both the media and academia for meeting the long-term target of traditional donors—spending at least 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on ODA. In Saudi Arabia’s case, this ratio exceeded 1% in 2021, while in the UAE it reached 0.9% in 2018. In this way, Arab donors effectively combine the South–South concept with the conventional development assistance system.

Although their approaches differ, BRICS nations have reasons to collaborate on development assistance. First, all the members are interested in creating a methodology for measuring aid that takes into account the priorities of emerging donors—whether for assessing the effectiveness of financing programs or for informing domestic and recipient-country audiences. The traditional aid accounting system, introduced by the OECD DAC in the 1960s, has been revised but still draws criticism, as it was designed by major donors to serve their own interests and needs. Typical points of contention concern the classification of domestic expenditures of donor countries (refugee costs, administrative overheads and student grants) as international development assistance and the exclusion of energy subsidies, an important instrument of Russian foreign policy. As early as 2012, the OECD DAC responded to dissatisfaction with the existing aid accounting system by initiating the development of a new measure, Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD), which relies on data provided by recipient countries. Yet a key challenge remains: recipients are unable to report regularly under this system. So it is fair to say that despite the traditional donors’ will to reform the system on their own while retaining regulatory leadership, they have yet to succeed.

Second, BRICS nations could deepen cooperation in humanitarian assistance. Since 2016, members have collaborated in disaster management and, in 2025, adopted a 2025–2028 work plan. Although the working group’s efforts center on sharing experience in disaster risk reduction rather than conducting joint humanitarian or rescue operations, engagement between the responsible agencies, building of horizontal connections and expertise exchange are laying the groundwork for broader cooperation, including in humanitarian assistance. At present, the focus remains on relatively standardized humanitarian aid projects, but over the longer term, it would be valuable to explore the possibility of running international development assistance projects under the BRICS framework. While this may be less attractive to the group’s members, as it does not always align with national priorities, it could generate synergies by pooling the countries’ strengths and expertise.

The third dimension involves the exchange of expertise in formulating international development assistance strategies. At first glance, the strategies and approaches of the countries differ: China concentrates on its trading partners and relies on the BRI; Arab states prioritize partners from the Islamic world and establish regional mechanisms; India and South Africa channel resources to vulnerable neighboring countries and leverage foreign ministries; Brazil engages with Portuguese-speaking nations and multilateral platforms. But all the countries share a drive to strengthen their national systems. For example, Russia is working on a draft federal law on international development assistance, aimed at streamlining the country’s aid provision. Despite the explicit call in the 2014 Concept of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Area of International Development Assistance to “place greater emphasis on targeted bilateral assistance programs,” most of Russia’s current international development programs still run through multilateral mechanisms, which reduces project control and visibility. Studying the experience of partners with similar priorities, such as China’s practice of linking projects to its major international initiative or Brazil’s targeting of a specific priority sector, is a critical step in establishing Russia’s system.

Amid growing discontent over traditional donors’ chronic failure to meet funding pledges, substantial cutbacks that have been announced, and stalled progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals, the conditions are ripe for introducing alternative approaches. BRICS countries have the capacity and potential to reform the system and boost their soft power; the only question is whether they have the will and ambition to do so.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On August 12, in New Delhi, diplomats from the Russian Embassy in India took part in the final day of the "Dialogue of Young Leaders 2.0" program organized by the BRICS Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

In his speech, Counselor and Press Secretary of the Russian diplomatic mission Petr Sizov spoke about the main areas of cooperation within the framework of #BRICS, Russian initiatives, and spoke in detail about preventing the policy of neocolonialism and pressure on the unification from the collective West.

He drew the audience's attention to the fact that BRICS aims to strengthen dialogue on key global issues, including within the framework of key multilateral forums such as the UN and the G20, and also firmly stands for the protection of the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety and interrelation as the basis of international law.

The event was attended by Indian politicians, representatives of the embassies of the countries of the association, youth and scientific, socio-political, business and journalistic circles.